COMMENTARY: “On the Mathematical Beauty of Aviccena’s Model of the GodWorld Relation,” by Matthew Williams
In his paper “Contrasting Models of the God-World Relationship: Avicenna,
Maimonides and Al-Shahrasānī,” Harrington Critchley makes a very cogent argument for
the superior adaptability of Avicenna’s model for the necessary existence of God, as
compared to Maimonides’ and Al-Shahrasānī’s own. Though there are certainly problems
to be found in Avicenna’s model, I would prefer to take this opportunity to admire rather
than critique it.
Certainly, since the time of Avicenna at least, there have been more scientificallyminded and evidentially-structured models seeking to show God’s necessary existence—I
am here thinking chiefly of William Paley’s “Evidence of Design,” and Robin Le
Poidevin’s “Are We the Outcome of Chance or Design?”—that argue the same thing he
does; however, few if any express the same sort of mathematical beauty in their
formulation. Though it would be nearly another 850 years before Georg Cantor
developed the ‘Theory of Sets’ in mathematics, Avicenna we see a very basic, yet elegant
operation of these same principles.
In set theoretical mathematics, the basic premise is that the entirety of the world
can be broken down into these abstract representations that we call sets. While this relates
primarily to mathematical objects such as numbers, it can be applied to real objects as
well. In a way, Avicenna accomplishes this with his representation of God as the
“Necessary Existent.” Wish that I could go into greater detail on this for the sake of
formal proof than space allows me, but as I cannot I ask that my audience grant me some

liberties in making certain claims and assumptions. I assure you, all of them are valid;
they merely want of a fuller explanation than I may give here.
The most basic premise of Avicenna’s is that ‘the Necessary Existent “has no
cause,” so as to be necessary “in all [His] aspects’” (emphasis my own). This tells us that
the most prominent attribute of God is His necessity. Even his relationship with all his
other attributes is secondary to this one, out of which they obtain. Right out of the gate
here, we are presented with the primary relation of both God and the universe itself: The
nature of necessity. Now, if God cannot be defined in terms of his other attributes without
them in turn being defined by necessity, it follows that his other traits are an output of
necessity.
In this way, we are granted the authority to claim that God is defined by his
relation to necessity; or that xRx, where x can be either God or necessity, for they mean
in this case one and the same thing: That without which none else may exist. Recall that
God’s other attributes are outputs of their relation to necessity. So, for example, God’s
transcendence must exist because it is necessary that God is transcends the material
universe he created in order to have created it. This we can define as y = transcendence
and belongs to the ordered pair of <x,y>, where any <x,y>={{x}, {x,y}}. Essentially, this
tells us that all of God’s other attributes—such as his transcendence—are outflows from
his necessity and these attributes cannot exist separately from it.
“Now,” one might be tempted to say, “that is all very well and good, but what
about the contingent order?,” i.e. the World and its tiers. “Surely the kind of necessity we
speak of when we talk of God is not the same we speak of when we talk of contingent
existence.” At first blush it seems this is true. After all, how can he who is outside of

space-time be a product of the same sort of necessity that we are? But it is just this
formulation of the question that is mistaken; instead we should ask how we could be a
product of his type of necessity. As God is the Necessary Existent, his very existence
defines the scope of understanding for necessity. And there is nothing within this scope
that it would be remiss in its use to describe his relation to us. If necessity is not the
problem here, then it must be our understanding of contingent.
By contingent, we can take Avicenna to mean as ‘having a dependence upon
some absolute transcendent necessary being to create it.’ If we take this as our definition,
then it follows logically that the world itself (a) is a further output of God’s necessity (a
set A), such that it is both an element and a subset of it (a⊊A). However, the modes of
being for the Necessary Existent and the contingent world are too different for this alone
to be enough; we must disjoint them somehow. In order to make them disjoint we must
conceive of world’s relation to God as somehow being functional. Thankfully, Avicenna
provides one such possibility in the contingent world possessing the same form of
necessity, but not the same degree, because God encompasses even the negation of those
features which are ascribed to him. This negation is an outflow of his true being.
Existence in the contingent world then is a function of God. It stems in the first
place from the fact that the domain of necessity acts upon all attributes of God, including
those which are negated of him. So, those negated attributes, while necessary, cannot
exist within God; as a result, they find themselves the function of an external expression
of God’s necessity, such that   
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element of God (the domain) which by definition cannot be contained within himself are
represented in the world as expressions of the range, via a relation of necessity.

Thus, we have a functional relationship between the Necessary Existent and the
contingent world that has but a single element at its base: The concept of necessity.
Though I have rather messily gone about constructing this set theoretical representation
of Avicenna’s argument for the existence of God—indeed, I have skipped whole proofs
in the process—it has much merit and a sense of mathematical elegance to it that one
does not see in other models. Given more time, I believe it would be possible to create a
properly rigorous version of this. However, in as loose a form as time has allowed, I hope
to have shown at least a small fraction of the mathematical beauty inherent in Avicenna’s
model of the God-World.

